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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the legal issue of an implied easement by prior use. The parties 
stipulated at the start of trial that the trial did not involve any legal theory other than an easement 
implied by prior use. (Tr. I, p. 7, L 5-17). The dispute is over a road and right of way in Fremont . 
County, Idaho which arose as a result of the division of 80 acres of farmland in December of 
1995, by Virgil and Lillis Mickelsen to Appellant, Bird, Respondent, Bidwell, Roger and Carol 
Murri, and the heirs of Wayne Mickelsen. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 1,2, 13). 
At the time of the division, the Murri and Wayne Mickelsen parcels each fronted a 
Fremont County road. Virgil Mickelsen granted a 30-foot easement to the Bidwell property 
along the west side of the farm, though the Virgil Mickelsen yard and farm buildings and 
through the Murri property. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 2). Mr. Mickelsen granted Birds 66 feet 
along the east side of the farm to access their property. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 1). 
The Birdslappellants assert that they have an implied easement by prior use over the 30- 
foot lane or track which was granted to the Bidwells which crosses the former Virgil Mickeslen 
and Murri property, which is presently owned by the Bidwells. They claim a road or track -. was - in 
existence in December of 1995 which entitled them to access their property over the Virgil 
Mickelsen and M m i  property when they received a deed to their parcel of property and that the 
access was theirs through an Implied Easement. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 10, L 6-24). 
The parties stipulated at the beginning of trial that all of the pycels in controversy were 
owned, in unity of ownership, by Virgil Mickelsen, at the time of the grant of the dominant 
\ 
estate, which estate is owned by the Birds. (Tr. Vol. I, p.2, L. 19-25; Tr. Vol. I, p.3, L. 1-4). 
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11. Course o f  Proceedings 
The Birds filed a Verified Complaint For Declarative and Injunctive Relief on August 9, 
2007, in Fremont County Case No. CV-2007-443, claiming an implied easement by prior use. 
Bidwells filed an Answer on Augusf. 16,2007 denying an implied easement by prior use. 
Thereafter, discovery was conducted and trial was held on January 3 1,2008. The trial court 
entered a Judgment, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 
4,2008 denying the Birds' requested relief. The Birds filed a Notice of Appeal on May 12,2008. 
1x1. Facts 
Virgil and Lillis Mickelsen, the parents of Verla Bird, Appellant, and Linda Bidwell, 
Respondent, owned approximately 80 acres of farmland in Fremont County, Idaho. On April 8, 
1986, Roger and Carol Murri, (Carol Murri being Virgil and Lillis Mickelsen's daughter) 
purchased the Mickelsen's approximately 80 acres excepting the Mickelsen residence and 
surrounding yard located in the southwest comer of the farm. (Tr. Vol. I, p.130, L. 15-18). At 
the time the property was purchased by the Murris, the road in question exited the Fremont 
County road on the south of the property and traveled north within approximately 10 feet of the 
front of the Mickelsen house and ended at a feed lot approximately 100 yards north of the - county - 
road. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 13 1, L. 1-25; Tr.Vol. I, Exhibit 32). Hay and straw were piled in the road or 
track, which is in contention, between June and November each year the Murris owned the 
property. (Tr. Vol. I, Exhibits 40 & 41) Any travel beyond the feed yard was on foot during the 
Murri ownership. (Tr. Vol. I, p.131, L. 19-25; Tr. Vol. I, p.132, L. 20325; Tr. Vol. I, p.133, L. 1- 
25; Tr. Vol. I, p.134, L. 1-8). On May 19, 1995, the Murris were unable to make the payments 
on the f m  and deeded the property back to Virgil Mickelsen. (Tr. Vol. I. p.143, L. 1-6; Trial 
Exhibit 4). 
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On December 18, 1995, the Mickelsens deeded 17.44 acres on the southeast side of the 
80 acres to the children of their deceased son, Wayne Mickelsen, who are not parties to this suit. 
On December 18, 1995, the Birds were deeded 20.34 acres, by Warranty Deed from VirgiI 
Mickelsen. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, L.4-19; Trial Exhibit 8). On the same day, the Bidwells were granted 
24.56 acres by Warranty Deed, north of the canal immediately to the north of the Birds' parcel of 
property. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, L.19-20; Trial Exhibit 2). That same day, Virgil Mickelsen also 
granted to Roger and Carol Murri by Warranty Deed, 16.89 acres north and east of the farmstead, 
which included the hay shed and barn. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 8). Virgil and LiIlis Mickelsen 
retained a parcel 195 feet by 171 feet in the southwest comer of the fann which included the 
house and yard. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 9). The Murri parcel lies immediately to the south of 
the Birds' property. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 13). 
The Deed granting prope* to the Bidwells contained language that granted them a "30 
Ft. right of way into the property along the west side of property and through and around the 
existing buildings." (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 2). The Deeds granting property to the Birds and 
Murris respectively contained the following language: "Excepting thereon that part used for the 
30 ft. right of way on west side of property & road and highway right of way." (Tr. Vol. I, - Trial -
Exhibit 8,9). The Birds were granted an additional 66-foot wide strip of land on the east side of 
the Mickelsen properly, which strip abuts the county road. (Tr. Vol. I, Trial Exhibit 8). 
Upon the death of Virgil and Lillis Mickelsen, Gary and Linda Bidwell received the home 
and yard of Virgil and Lillis Mickelsen on November 30,2006. (Tr. yol. I, p. 200, L 19-25, Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 201, L 1-25). 
The Birds claim in their appellant brief that they openly and continuously used the lane or 
cow track, as it was characterized at trial, on the west side of the farm for access to the parcel of 
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land that was deeded to them in 1995. (Birds' Appellant Brief in their Statement of Facts, 
paragraph 7). There was no testimony at trial of the Birds open and continuous use of the road. 
Gary Bidwell testified that the Birds did not continuously travel over the road in contention prior 
to 1995. (TR. Vol. I, p. 212, L12-25) The question is not whether the Birds used the road openly 
and continuously, it is whether there was apparent continuous use long enough before separation 
of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent. Thomas v. Madsen, 
142 Idaho 635,638 (2006); Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637. The court found there was not an 
implied easement because, clearly, it was not intended to be permanent. 
APPELLANTS' ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial court err in finding that the language of the deeds to parcels #I ,  #2 and 
#3 specifically excepted the lane from the Birds' use? 
B. Did the trial court e n  in finding that it must be inferred from the Mickelsens' 
exception of the lane from the deed transcriptions of deeds #2 and #3 that the Mickelsens 
intended to provide access only to parcel # I  across their homestead and along the existing lane? 
C. Did the trial court err in finding that "there [was] no other explanation for [the 
Mickelsens'] decision to convey the extra 66 feet to the Birds, while exempting the lane, if it was .- 
intended that the Birds continue to use the lane to access that parcel"? 
D. Did the trial court err in considering and applying the language of the deeds to its 
determination of whether the Birds had an implied easement from prior use? 
E. Did the trial court err in making findings of fact regarding yirgil Mickelsens' 
subjective intent with regard to the use of the lane? 
F. Did the trial court err in finding that "the cost of placing a lane along the 66-foot strip 
from the road to parcel #2 [was] a matter of considerable dispute?" 
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G. Did the trial court e n  in examinin.g and considering facts other than the use of the 
easement to determine whether there was apparent continuous use long enough before separation 
of the dominant Estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent? 
H. Did the trial court err in finding that "when the Mickelsens, at the Birds' request, 
deeded the strip abutting the county road and specificalIy excIuded the lane in the same deed they 
extinguished any basis for the Birds to rely on what may otherwise have been an implied 
easement to use the lane?" 
I. Did the trial court err in finding that "the specific reference to a right of way in the 
Deed conveying parcel #1 to the Bidwells, coupled with the specific exceptions to the lane found 
in the language of the Deeds conveying parcel #2 and parcel #3, clearly establishes that the 
Mickelsen did not convey nor did they intend to grant an easement across their homestead or on 
the lane along the western portion of parcel #3 for the benefit of the Murris or the Birds."? 
J. Did the trial court e n  in determining that "the Birds have failed to meet their burden to 
establish that use of the lane was ever intended to continue for any parcel other than parcel #1 
when the Mickelsens divided their farm among the family"? 
ATTORNEY FEES - - 
The Bidwells request their attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 33 
12-121, 12-123, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 
41, or other applicable rule of civil procedure, or statute. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW j 
A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in 
favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. Lindgren v. 
Martin, 130 Idaho 854,857,949 P.2d 1061,1064 (1997); Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. 
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v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). It is the province 
of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. Abbott v. Numpu School Dist. No. 13 1, 1 19 Idaho 544, 
808 P.2d 1289 (1991); LRC.P. 52(a). Findings of fact that are based on substantial evidence, 
even if the evidence is conflicting, will not be overturned on appeal. Hunter v. Shields, 13 I 
Idaho 148,953 P.2d 588 (1998). However, we exercise free review over the lower court's 
conclusions of law to determine whether the trial court correctly stated the applicable law, and 
whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 
265,985 P2d 1127. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE LANGUAGE OF 
THE DEEDS TO THE BIDWELL, MURRf AND BIRD PARCELS SPECIFICALLY 
EXCEPTED THE LANE FROM THE BIRDS' USE 
The trial court made a finding that: 
"The Bidwell deed specifically grants a 'right of way' through the homestead and along 
the lane to access parcel #I. On the other hand, the Bird deed to parcel #2, and the M L U ~  deed to 
parcel #3 specifically except the lane from such use, and both parcels abut the county road under 
the conveyance. Were it not for these facts, the Court would conclude that the doctrine of 
implied easement by prior use would support the Birds' claim to use the lane." ( R. Vol. I, p. 
24). .- - ,~ 
The Court made a finding of fact that "to 1995, either Virgil Mickelsen or Roger Murri 
operated the farm and used the lane, as necessary, for purposes related to farming. Other family 
members sporadically used the lane when visiting the family farm." ( R. Vol. I, p.21). The court 
did not find there was apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant 
estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent nor did it find that the lane was 
reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant estate. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 
635,638 (2006); Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637 (1999). The trial court found specifically that 
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". , . the evidence does not support a finding that the use of the lane was intended to be 
permanent at the time the property was deeded in parcels to family members." ( R. Vol. I, p. 25). 
Mr. Murri testified, and the trial court so found, that when he started working on the farm 
in 1979 that there were three tracks or paths which traveled north from the County road to the 
property which was deeded to Bird. There was a path, or a dirt track, that left the county 
roadway near the center of the 80 acres east of the Wayne Mickelsen home and proceeded in a 
northeasterly direction around the east side of the Wayne Mickelsen home, across the property 
which was to be deeded to Wayne Mickelsen, that accessed the Bird property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 154, 
L.4). There was also an access that left the north side of the county road on the east side of the 
Mickelsen home and proceeded by a path or dirt track around the south end of the milking barn 
and thence northeasterly across the property which was deeded to Roger and Carol Murri. It 
ended at the Bird property. (Tr. Vol. I, p.154, L.4); (Tr. Vol. I, p. 136, L.6-25; R Vol. I, p. 25). 
Roger Murri also testified that there was a track which was used for the cows to get to 
pasture from May through August which left the feed area behind the Virgil Mickelsen home and 
proceeded north along the western edge of the Mickelsen farm. (Tr. Vol. I, p.172, Ll-7). The 
lane was never used by people to camp on the back of the property during the ownership of - - 
Roger Murri. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 172, L 7-13. The Birds never took a vehicle on the road while 
Murri owned the farm. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 172 L. 16-25). According to Mr. Muni, the lane was not 
necessary for access to the Bird property. (Tr. Vol. I, p 173, L7-25). It was Murri's 
understanding that Virgil Mickelsen intended for everyone to have a c k  to his property and that 
is why Mr. Mickelsen did what he did. (Tr. Vol,, I, p. 174, L 1-14). The lane was not traveled 
by a vehicle in the 10 years Murri owned the farm. Mr. Murri drove a tractor down the lane 
maybe two times a year. (Tr. Vol. I, p 176, L 1-25; Tr. Vol. I, p. 177 L1-23). 
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I 
I i 
The first unrecorded deed from Mickelsen to Bidwell had no road provision. (Tr. Vol. I; 
Exhibit 35). Also, the first unrecorded deed from Mickelsen to Birds had no provision for 
access. (Tr. Vol. I, Exhibit 36). Upon receipt of the draft deeds, both Bidwell and Bird 
recognized they had no access and that they were landlocked. They each requested a specific 
declaration in their deed giving them access to the Fremont County road. (Tr. Vol. I, p 139, L1- 
25; Tr. VoI. I, p. 140, L1-25; Tr. Vol. I, Ex. 15). Each party received access in writing in their 
respective deeds by Bidwell receiving a 30-foot right of way on the west and Bird receiving a 66- 
foot strip of land on the east, which adjoined the County road. (Tr. Vol. I, Exhibit 1 & 2; Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 149, L1-25; Tr. Vol. I, p.150, L1-25). 
Roger Murri, brother-in-law to both Bidwell and Bird, testified regarding the property 
each party received and the circumstances surrounding the granting of the deeds, the access and 
how each description was determined. The most telling evidence which shows that the use in 
1995 over the west track was not intended to be permanent access for either Bidwell or Bird is 
Trial Exhibit 15 which is a statement given by Roger Murri on September 5,2007, which states 
in part: 
". . . We then took the measurements of the draft and staked out the suggested comers of 
the boundary between the Mickelsen's and the Muni's on the south side of the Bird's propsed- 
property. Then the Bidwells realized that they needed a way to get to their piece of ground. It 
was then decided that they would get a thirty-foot right of way on the West Side of Virgil's farm 
to get to their proposed piece of ground. Mike decided that he didn't want their piece of ground 
to be land locked either so he wanted a way to get to their property also. He said that they would 
need more than 30 feet though and that they would need at least 66 feet. Virgil then asked my 
opinion of what I thought would be a good way to accommodate his desire to have his property 
more accessible. I told him that in my opinion it would be good to giJe him the extra footage he 
needed on the East Side of the farm. This would make it a part of the property that he intended 
to give Mike and Verla already. Virgil thought this should be satisfactory with the Birds and I 
was not aware of any disagreement to the proposed plan." 
It is clear from Trial Exhibit 15 that neither of the three parties that is Virgil Mickelsen, 
Gary Bidwell nor Mike Bird, believed that any of the three roads or tracks over the parcels which 
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were to be deeded were roads intended to be permanent under the theory of "implied easement by 
use" which were meant to be access, for either Gary Bidwell or Mike Bird to their respective 
properties. 
The Birds are attempting to show through some interpretation of the term "right of way" 
that they were not prohibited from using the right of way granted to Bidwell over the Murri and 
Mickelsen parcels. The Birds disregard the fact that they were not granted a right of way over 
the Bidwell easement nor over the other two tracks, one of which went around the barn on the 
Virgil Mickelsen homestead, (Tr. Vol. I, p. 135, L 2-25; Exhibits 23,24 & 25), and the other 
which left the county road and proceeded northerly across the Wayne Mickelsen property to the 
Bird property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 136 L. 1-25; Exhibit 31). If the Birds had no implied easement at 
the time of division, then they certainly had no right to trespass on the Mickelsen or Murri 
property by traveling over those two properties on any right of way granted to the Bidwells. 
11. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT N CONSIDERING THE EXTRA 66 FEET 
GRANTED TO THE BIRDS 
Appellants rely upon the legal theory of implied easement from wrior use. In an action to 
establish an "Implied Easement From Prior Use," the party seeking to establish the easement 
must show (1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of the dominant 
estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show 
that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to 
the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,638 (2006); 
Davis v. Peacock, 1133 Idaho 637 (1999). 
i 
As was held by the court in interpreting an implied easement from prior use in Eisenbarth 
v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, (1950), it is for the court ". . . to balance the respective convenience, 
inconvenience, costs and other pertinent facts in determining an implied easement from prior 
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use." Birds have met their burden of unity of title. However, the element of continuous use of a 
roadway long before separation of the dominant estate has not been met. The Birds, are seeking 
a private road across the property originally deeded to the Murris which is a burden to the Muni 
property. 
A "Private road" is defined in I.C. 49-1 17 - P. - (16) as follows: "Private road" means 
every way or place in private ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those 
having express or implied permission from the owner, but not other persons. It was stipulated at 
the start of trial that there was no claim by Birds of an easement by adverse use. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 7, 
L. 4- 16). 
Defendant, Gary Bidwell, and Roger Muni testified that at the time the dominant estate 
was severed in December of I995 that there was no roadway as defined by the Idaho Code on the 
western edge, or any portion, of the property deeded to the Birds which had been in continuous 
use long enough before separation to show that the use was intended to be permanent. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 212, L 14-25; Tr. Vol. I, p. 213, L. 1-25). 
In this case, the parties stipulated that the first element was satisfied. (Tr. Vol. I, p.2, L. 
19-25; Tr. Vol. I, p.3, L.l-4). The subjective intent of the grantor was found to be relevant - to the - 
determination of whether a driveway was intended to be permanent in the case of Thomas v. 
Madsen, 142 Idaho 635 at page 638, contrary to Birds' argument in their Appellant brief. Idaho 
law does contemplate an inquiry into the mind of the grantor of his subjective intentions. For 
example, in the case of Thomas v. Mudsen, Id., at 637, in which the plaintiff himself was the 
grantor the Supreme Court's analysis opined that Thomas intended the driveway to be permanent 
because of the maintenance of the driveway for more than 70 years. The trial court in this case, 
in examining the grantor's intent, concluded that grantor, Virgil Mickelsen, intended to give each 
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Grantee private access to each party's respective parcel. T Vol. I, p. 17-26). It is evident that 
Mr. Mickelsen did not intend for either of the three dirt tracks to be permanent access to either 
the Bird or Bidwell property. 
The evidence showed that the Bidwells were deeded a 30-foot easement to their property 
and the Birds were deeded a 66-foot tract of land for access to their property from the county 
road. This is further proof that Mr. Mickelsen and the recipients of the various tracts did not 
regard the so-called roadway on the western edge of the Mickelsen property to have been 
continuously used and that it was intended or reasonably necessary to be a permanent access to 
either the Bidwell or Bird property. If Birds' theory of the case is correct, there would have 
been no need to deed a 66-foot strip of land to the Birds on the east side of the Mickelsen 
property for a road, nor would have a deeded easement to the Bidwells for access to the Bidwell 
property have been necessary. If there was no need for a deeded easement, under the theory of 
the Birds, the 66 feet should have been added to the south side of the Bird property so it could 
have been f m e d  and the Birds could simply appropriate one of three accesses, i.e., the cow lane 
over which an easement was granted to the Bidwells, the road in front of the barn and northeast 
across the M w i  property or the access on the east side of the Wayne Mickelsen house to the Bird . - 
property. All thee of these accesses were equal in 1995 and all three of them were not intended 
to be treated as continuous, necessary or permanent to give Birds access to their property. (Tr. 
Vol. I, Exhibits 21,26, 30 & 3 1). The need for a 30-foot easement to Bidwells and a strip of land 
66-feet in width to the Birds is evident from the actions of Virgil MicFelsen and the recipients of 
the four tracts of property. (Tr. Vol., I, Exhibit 15). Can the court imagine the chaos if Bird and 
\ 
Bidwell claimed access to their property over one or all of the three paths or tracks that had been 
used over the years? Mr. Mickelsen obviously was not interested in a family feud over access so 
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he made sure each property holder had access to his or her property. 
The trial court was correct in finding that "there is no other explanation for the decision 
to convey the extra sixty-six feet to the Birds, while exempting the lane, if it was intended that 
the Birds continue to use the lane to access that parcel." ( R Vol. I, p.24) 
111. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE "COST OF 
PLACING A LANE ALONG THE 66 FOOT STRIP FROM THE ROAD TO PARCEL #2 
JWASl A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE DISPUTE" 
The Bird's cause of action must also fail because of the third element, being: "(3) the 
easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Thomas 
v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, (2006). In the present case, there were three accesses to the Bird 
property at the time of severance which were all dirt tracks across the property to be deeded to 
the Murris and the Wayne Mickelsm family. None of the three were graveled definable 
roadways. (Tr. Vol. I, p.154, L.4); (Tr. Vol. I, p.136, L.6-25). (Tr. Vol. I, p.154, L.4). 
The evidence is clear that Mr. Mickelsen and the three discussed access to the 
various tracts. (Tr. Vo. I, Exhibit 15). Mr. Bird and Mr. Bidwell brought to the attention of Mr. 
Mickelsen that they both desired a written access to their property because they were both 
landlocked. (Tr. Vol. I, Exhibit 15). It is evident that Mr. Mickelsen and Mr. Bird did not 
- - 
believe the trail along the west side of the 80-acre tract was necessary to access the Bird property 
because Mr. Mickelsen did not grant the Birds an interest in the 30-foot easement which he 
granted to the Bidwells, nor did the Birds request that they be added to the easement. 
When Virgil and Lillis Mickelsen made a gift of the property Birds, they excepted that 
part "used for a 30-foot right of way on west side." Tr. Vol. I, p. 42, L 11-16; Exhibit 1). The 
evidence is clear that Mr. Bird requested a 66-foot strip of land on the east side of the Mickelsen 
property because he was landlocked. He received the 66-foot parcel because the Bidwell 
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easement and the other two tracks across the Mickelsen property were not necessary for the Bird 
access. 
Mr. Murri testified that the access Mr. Bird requested along the eastern side of the 
Mickelsen property, 66 feet in width, was to access his property in the area where it was testified 
he intended to build a home or establish a camp site. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 160, L. 8). In fact, the 
evidence was clear that in the year 2000, Mr. Bird applied for and obtained a permit from 
Fremont County, Idaho to build an access off of the county road onto his 66-foot tract for a road. 
(Tr. Vol. I, Exhibit 42). 
As was held in the Eisenbarth v. Delp, supra, when the court balances the respective 
convenience, inconvenience, costs and other pertinent facts, Appellants have failed. Bidwells 
and Birds were each given an access to their property over dirt tracks which required 
improvement for either to use his track as a road. Mr. Bidwell testified he contacted Parker Sand 
and Gravel of St. Anthony, Idaho, who built his road. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 205 L 1-25; Tr. Vol. I, p. 
206 L.l-25; Tr. Vol . I, p. 207 L 1-23). Mr. Bidwell obtained a bid for $6,800.00 from Parker 
Sand and Gravel to build a road over the Bird access which was of the same quality as that which 
Parker Sand and Gravel built for him. (Tr. Vol. I, Exhibit 3 1 and 39). 
The access over the Bidwell easement was not convenient for the Birds in 1995. Mr. 
Murri testified the Birds were going to build a home or camp site at the north end of their 66-foot 
strip on the east side of their property. (Tr Voi. I, p. 149, L 14-25. I~would have been 
inconvenient for the Birds to have been granted an access on the west side of the farm because 
when they reached the southwest comer of their property it would have been necessary for them 
to build a road east one-quarter of a mile to their proposed home site or camp site. (Tr. Vol. I, 
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Exhibit 4). 
Access for the Birds over the Bidwell easement, which was within 10 feet of the front of 
the Mickelsen home and through the barnyard, was inconvenient for the Mickelsens. Because 
the Bidwells were going to inherit the Mickelsen homestead, it was logical and convenient for 
the Bidwells to be given an access in front of the house and through the farm yard to the property 
they were given. 
The 66-foot right of way given to Birds was far more convenient and better access than 
that which was available over the unimproved 30-foot right of way deeded to Bidwells or the 
other two tracks over the Roger Murri or Wayne Mickelsen family property. Mr. Bidwell has 
improved his access with the help of Parker Sand and Gravel. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 202, L 12-25; Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 205, L 2-25) Mr. Bird has qot. It would have cost each the same in 1996. (Tr. Vol. 1, 
Exhibit 39). It is doubtful if this case would be in court had the Bidwells left the hay and straw 
in the middle of their deeded access, left the road unimproved with water leaking onto it in the 
summer and no winter access. The Bidwells could have waited for the Birds to improve their 
access and then they could claim that through implied easement through prior use the Bird - 
easement was also for them to gain access to their property. 
In balancing the respective convenience, inconvenience, costs and other pertinent facts, as 
indicated in the Eisenbarth v. Delp, (supra) and the continuous use element long before 
separation which was intended to be permanent and the reasonable n&essity for the proper 
enjoyment of the dominant estate as indicated in the Thomas case (supra) it secrns to that,the 
intention of the grantor and the action of the parties must be taken into account. The facts of the 
case seem to indicate that none of the parties, including Mr. Mickelsen, knew of or intended an 
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easement to any of the parcels through a claim of implied easement from prior use. That theory 
has been developed by Birds after the death or Mr. and Mrs. Miclelsen, and after the Bidwells 
improved their right of way. 
On December 18, 1995, all accesses were equal. They all required improvement so there 
would be a roadway as the term is commonly used for vehicular and year around use. The Birds 
and Bidwells were each given tracts of land with access. The other properties fronted the county 
road. Apparently the gift to the Birds was not enough. They now want the Bidwells to give them 
a finished roadway. This gift to the Birds has gone awry. It has pitted family members against 
family members all because the Bird family is attempting to take something they were not given. 
In Thomas, Id., the trial court analyzed the reasonable necessity of the road at issue by 
weighing t k  expense and time of constructing a road of the same quality on Thomas's land. In 
this matter, the trial court found that the cost of placing a lane along the Bird's 66-foot strip of 
land "a matter of considerable dispute." ( R, Vol. 1, p. 25). The bid of Parker Sand and Gravel, 
which was for a road comparable to that of the Bidwells, was $6,800.00. (Tr. Vol. I, Exhibit 39). 
The Zollinger bid of $30,000.00 was for a far superior road, which would have been in a - - 
condition to be paved. (Tr. Vol. I, p 121, L. 12-24), The trial court was right in finding there 
was considerable dispute in the type of road to be built and its cost. A road, such as the road to 
the Bidwell property suffices for the Bidwell use which is similar to the Bird use. The Birds 
could have obtained a bid for a freeway or paved road, and submittedh so there would be an 
even larger dispute. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT WHEN "THE MICKELSENS. 
AT THE BIRD'S REOUEST. DEEDED THE STRIP ABUTTING THE COUNTY ROAD AND 
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED THE LANE IN THE SAME DEED THEY EXTINGUISHED 
ANY BASIS FOR THE BIRDS TO RELY ON WHAT MAY OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN AN 
IMPLIED EASEMENT TO USE THE LANE" 
The Birds claim the trial court essentially concluded that the Birds knew at the time of 
severance that they had no right to use the Lane because of the language in the Deed and because 
they were granted land on the east side of the property which abuts a county road. The trial court 
did not conclude that this knowledge "extinguished" their implied easement by prior use. The 
law of Idaho is that p&ies are presumed to know the implied easement law. It was stated clearly 
in Wilson v. State ofIdaho, I33 Idaho 874, (App. 2000) that "it is axiomatic that citizens are 
presumptively charged with knowledge of the law once such laws are passed. Atkins v. Parker, 
472U.S. I I T ,  130 (1985); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hofman, 268 U.S. 276,283 (1925). 
Ignorance of the law is not a defense. Smith v. Zero Defects, Inc., 132 Idaho 881,887,980 P.2d 
545,551 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,926,866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). "The entire 
structure of our democratic government rests on the premise that the individual citizen is capable 
of informing himself about the particular policies that affect his destiny." Atkins, 472 U.S. at - 
13 1. The law presumed that in 1995, the Mickelsens, Birds, Murris and Bidwells knew the three 
elements of an implied easement. Based upon their knowledge, all three participants co~icluded 
that the three unimproved tracks across the respective parcels did n0.t rise to an implied easement 
for a road to any of the parcels. Both parties knew their particular pdcel was landlocked. With 
that in mind, Bidwell and Bird requested a specific deeded access to their respective parcels of 
property. Mr. Mickelsen decided to not deed the parcels to Bidwell and Bird without granting 
each a specific roadway. (Tr. VoI. I, Exhibit 15). 
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V. THE TRIAL COCRT WAS CORRECT IN UETEIIMINN(? THAT THE BIRDS 
l?AlL.ED TO MEET THEIR RCRDL:N 'TO EST.ARI.ISFI TI-liXT USE OF THE LAXE WAS 
EVER STETLIED TO CONTMI.IE FOR .ANY P.1KCEL OTHER TI-IAN PARCEI. b l  WHJB - 
THE bIICKEI.SJNS DII'IDED TI-IEIR F A M I  .AMOSG 'I'I-IE FA.MII.II, 
In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, the pariy asserting the easement 
must prove three elements: (1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of 
the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant 
estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be 
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 
Idaho at 638. 
! As noted above, the first element was stipulated to by the parties. As to the second 
i 
I element, the trial court made a factual finding that, since 1954, "The lane has been fenced on 
I , 
both sides and used as a farm lane to haul hay, move cattle betweeri the corrals and pasture, 
I access the northern end of the farm, clean ditches, picnics, access a flume across the canal to 
facilitate repairs, move farm machinery, etc." ( R. Vol. I, p.20). The trial court also made a 
1 
finding that "to 1995, either Virgil MickeIsen or Roger Muni operated the farm and used the 
- 
lane, as necessary, for purposes related to farming. Other famiIy members sporadically used the 
lane when visiting the family farm." ( R. Vol. I, p.22). Applying these facts to the second element 
of the standard ("apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate 
to show that the use was intended to be permanent"), the trial court co cluded that it was the P 
intent of the grantor to grant an exclusive easement to each piece of property and that there as not 
any implied easement over any of the three tracks. 
Both Bird and Bidwell recognized there was not an implied easement when they each 
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requested a specific easement. (Tr. Vol. I, Exhibit 15). The grantors elected to not deed the 
property to Bird and Bidwell without granting them a specific ability to access their own property 
without intruding upon the other grantees' fee simple interest in their land. (Tr. Vol. I, Exhibit 
15). 
This cout exercises free review over questions of law. This court can find, based upon 
all of the evidence adduced at trial, that the trial court was correct in concluding that the Birds 
did not establish all three of the elements required by Idaho law for establishing an implied 
easement by prior use. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defe~idantsirespondents request that this Court issue its 
decision upholding the entry of jt,&ment against plaintiffs1Appellants and enter judgment for 
defendants1Respondents for their attorney fees and costs. 
Dated this 16th day of September 2008. 
. 
ossner 
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